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THE "PERSON" AT FEDERAL LAW: A FRAMEWORK
AND A RICO TEST SUITE
Michaelj Gerardi*
INTRODUCTION
Who does this statute address? Usually, the answer at federal law is
that the statute addresses things known as "persons." Lawyers typically
only go this far when doing statutory analysis. They fail to ask a sec-
ond, more penetrating, question: What, exactly, is a "person"? The
word "person" describes the entities to which the law assigns rights
and duties. Theories of culpability connect these entities to legally
prescribed behavior, and serve as a restraint on the size of the class of
persons that are potentially liable for a violation of law.
The forces that shape the meaning of the term "person" place
considerable strain upon it. Attempts by the courts and Congress to
wrestle with the problems of statutory construction presented by per-
sonhood created a body of interpretive rules surrounding the term
"person" that fail to provide the necessary certainty and consistency
expected from basic legal definitions. This Note aims to describe fed-
eral law's use of the term "person" to define those with legal duties
and rights, show how the current framework fails to adequately
achieve these goals through its application to a typical "personhood"
problem, and outline some simple proposals that will give the frame-
work a far greater degree of coherence.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; B.S., Electrical
Engineering, University of Notre Dame, 2007. I thank G. Robert Blakey for his
mentoring and insight. This Note has its origins in my work as Professor Blakey's
research assistant in the summer of 2008; a lengthy footnote from one of his articles
served as inspiration. See G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context:
Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 290 n.151 (1982). I thank
Alexis Zouhary and all my friends on the Notre Dame Law Review for their invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this Note for publication. Cf Michael Coenen,
Rhapsody in Blue: An Ode to The Bluebook, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 115 (2008) (praising, in
verse, the cite-checker's most potent weapon). Finally, I thank my father, Joseph, and
my mother, Sharon, without whom none of this was possible.
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Part I describes a theoretical framework for answering per-
sonhood questions at federal law. It begins with a general discussion
of the concept of the legal person, and of the theories of criminal and
civil liability entrenched in federal law that connect legal "persons" to
rights and obligations Congress creates by statute. It then describes
Congress' attempts to elaborate on these concepts through the Dic-
tionary Act's' definition of the term "person" and individual defini-
tions of the term in various statutory provisions. Part II employs a
"test suite" 2-the problem of whether municipalities are subject to
civil liability under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO) 3-to illustrate the inadequacies of the current
framework. Part III uses the descriptive analysis of Part I and the
applied analysis of Part II as a springboard for proposing improve-
ments to the current framework for resolving personhood questions
at federal law.
I. THE TERM "PERSON" AT FEDERAL LAW
The person is a fundamental unit of legal analysis. Despite its
centrality, personhood is difficult to describe succinctly because it cuts
across legal concepts that appear unrelated at first glance. This is
especially true in federal law because Congress' approach to defining
the term "person" has never been systematic. This Part of the Note
will first lay out the framework for understanding legal personhood
questions as a general matter, and then discuss the basic protocol
courts should follow when dealing with a question of whether or not a
particular individual or entity is a person under a federal statute.
A. The Concept of Legal Personhood
1. Entities to Which Rights and Duties Are Assigned
Few words enshrine as many important values and ideas as the
word "person." In common usage, it can be used to refer to one's
sense of self; one's role in life; or one's spiritual, psychological, and
emotional identity. 4 Personhood is also a seminal idea of the law;
1 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 6, 62 Stat. 683, 859 (codified as amended at 1
U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
2 "Test suite" is a term of art borrowed from computer science. It refers to a
program written in order to test the functionality of another piece of software. See
EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC LEGAL WRITING 22 (3d ed. 2007) (describing test suites).
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
4 11 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICrIONARY 596-98 (2d ed. 1989).
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"persons" are the "units" to which the law attaches rights and duties.5
Scholarly opinion on the nature of legal personhood is wide-ranging. 6
Categorizing something as a "person" is not meaningful solely in the
abstract. The classification has real significance in terms of how the
legal system will interact with a particular entity or group of entities. 7
Popular and legal concepts of personhood intersect insofar as all
natural persons are usually legal persons. One convenient way of dis-
cerning whether something is a legal person is to ask whether or not it
is "treated more or less as a human being" by the law.8 Occasionally,
theorists attempt to merge the popular and legal concepts of per-
5 4 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 191 (1959) ("One mode of securing interests
is to recognize or establish ... certain entities to which rights in the wider sense are
attributed; or on which legal rights, powers, and privileges are conferred; in which
liberties are recognized, and upon which duties and liabilities are imposed. These
entities have been known in the science of law, if not from antiquity certainly in the
modern world, by the name of persons ....").
6 See id. at 222 (identifying seven influential theories of legal personhood).
7 The history of American corporations is an excellent example of why this cate-
gorization matters. Early American corporate law conceived of corporations as artifi-
cial beings granted limited privileges by the state for the public good. See Trs. of
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) ("A corporation is
an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.");
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 72
(1992) ("Under the grant theory, the business corporation was regarded as an artifi-
cial being created by the state, with powers strictly limited by its charter of incorpora-
tion."). Thinking on this matter began to change after the Supreme Court's
surprising holding in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacfic Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394
(1886), that a corporation was a "person" within the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. Id. at 396. The case sparked a "virtual obsession" among legal scholars
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries about the nature of "corporate
personality." HORWITZ, supra, at 101. Ultimately, the view that the corporation was a
"natural entity," not unlike a human being for most legal purposes, took a foothold
among scholars, leading toward a more permissive regime of corporate law that facili-
tated the rise of modern business. See id. at 68 ("[T]he rise of a natural entity theory
of the corporation was a major factor in legitimating big business . . .none of the
other theoretical alternatives [for explaining the corporation's legal status] could pro-
vide as much sustenance to newly organized, concentrated enterprise"). Cases from
the early twentieth century testify to the triumph of the "natural entity" theory,
although this triumph was not unqualified. See, e.g., Herndon v. Chi., Rock Island, &
Pac. Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 135, 158 (1910) (rejecting a restriction on foreign corporations
as unconstitutional because the corporation "had become a person within the State
within the meaning of the Constitution, and entitled to its protection"); Hale v. Hen-
kel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (arguing that Fourth Amendment protections from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures attach to corporations). But see id. at 69-70 (denying
Fifth Amendment protections to corporations and declining to decide "whether a
corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of [the] Amendment").
8 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (8th ed. 2004).
.... 1
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sonhood by applying "[p]hilosophical and psychological theories of
personality" to the problem of legal personhood. 9 Such accounts do
not describe legal personhood in practice. 10 The law considers
abstract entities like corporations and governments to be persons in
many contexts, and even inanimate objects can obtain the status of
persons.1' In practice, legal personhood is best thought of as reflect-
ing a legal system's policy choices behind the enforcement of statutory
rights and responsibilities, making an accurate description of the
"lineup" of legal persons a statute addresses vital to proper interpreta-
tion of the law.
The term "person" lumps together two arguably distinct groups:
those liable under a statute, and those capable of asserting claims
under it.12 This merger is immaterial in most instances; those who
can violate a law typically have the ability to assert their rights under it.
Nevertheless, there are situations where policy considerations or over-
riding legal rules, such as sovereign immunity, dictate that the class of
persons with the capacity to bring claims may be broader than the
class of potentially liable persons. In spite of their usual counsels
9 See 4 POUND, supra note 5, at 198.
10 See id. ("[A]ttribut[ion] . . . of legal personality to an unborn child [and]
associations, business devices, masses of property, foundations . . . and in India to
idols . . . ha[s] tried the saving dogmatic fiction to the limit so that the nature of a
juristic person became one of the most vexed questions of the science of law." (foot-
notes omitted)).
11 Examples of this type of thinking abound. Recently, Ecuador ratified a new
constitution which confers human rights on the environment; thus, "nature" is a "per-
son" under Ecuadorian law. See CONSTITUCION DE LA REPOBLICA DEL ECUADOR ti. 2,
art. 10 (2008 rev.) ("Persons... have the fundamental rights guaranteed in this Con-
stitution and in the international human rights instruments. Nature is subject to
those rights given by this Constitution and Law."), translated in Thomas A.
Szyszkiewicz, Nature as a Privileged Minority, Am. SPECTATOR, Oct. 1, 2008, http://
spectator.org/archives/2008/10/01/nature-as-a-privileged-minorit. Federal forfei-
ture proceedings, which nominally run against the seized objects themselves, are a
more mainstream example of such thinking. See, e.g., United States v. 92 Buena Vista
Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 114 (1993) (affirming forfeiture of a piece of real estate purchased
with proceeds from drug sales); United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555, 556 (1983)
(affirming seizure of cash by Customs officials despite delay by the government in
filing civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. One Ford Coupe Auto., 272 U.S.
321, 323-24 (1926) (reversing dismissal of an order to seize a car used in defrauding
the United States of liquor taxes).
12 See United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 879
F.2d 20, 23 (1989) ("Whether the government has standing to sue and whether it
[can be sued] may, in the abstract, be different questions, but [when the statute uses
the word "person" to describe both groups] the answer to one is apparently the
answer to both.").
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against constructions giving statutory terms inconsistent meanings,' 3
courts will interpret the word "person" flexibly to comport with the
policy considerations behind the statute.1 4
2. Can "Person" Mean More than the Principal?
Statutes typically describe the behavior required to be guilty as a
principal; nevertheless, one should not assume that a statute is limited
to principals. The term "person" also describes the set of parties that
are responsible alongside the principal for violations of legal rights. 15
The two most important forms of such liability for purposes of this
Note are secondary liability (including conspiracy and aiding and
abetting) and vicarious liability. The potentially wide-ranging conse-
quences of the existence of non-primary liability in a given statute
make a proper grasp of its dimensions on both the civil and criminal
sides of the law crucial to deciphering personhood questions.
a. Civil Law
i. Vicarious Liability
At common law, those who stood as "masters" over their "ser-
vants" were responsible civilly for the servant's torts, independent of
fault. 16 That rule, known today as vicarious liability, was frequently
13 See, e.g., United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 (1941) (finding that,
since it was "hardly credible" that Congress meant the term "person" to have different
meanings within the same sentence of the Clayton Act's treble damages action, Con-
gress could not have intended to include the federal government in the term "per-
son"); cf. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 238-39 (1986)
("Without strong evidence to the contrary, we doubt that Congress intended the same
phrase to have significantly different meanings in two adjoining paragraphs of the
same subsection.").
14 See Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313 (1978) (rejecting, in the
Clayton Act context, "a technical or semantic approach in determining who is a 'per-
son' entitled to sue for treble damages"); Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162-63
(1942) (holding that a state is a "person" for purposes of bringing Sherman Act
claims and rejecting the argument that, since states were immune from such suits
under sovereign immunity doctrine, Cooper Corp. dictated a contrary result).
15 Federal criminal law's complicit party statute makes this relationship explicit.
The default rule in federal law is that those who are secondarily liable for an offense
are "punishable as a principal." 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Thus, the word "person" as
used in a criminal statute includes not only those who commit the principal offense,
but anyone who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures" the principal
offense. Id.
16 See Phile v. The Ship Anna, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 197, 207 (Pa. Ct. Comm. PI. 1787)
("The law never punishes any man criminally but for his own act, yet it frequently
punishes him in his pocket, for the act of another. Thus, if a wife commits an offence,
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the subject of pointed scholarly criticism during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. 17 Today, the most widely accepted
rationale for the rule is that it places liability on those best suited to
absorb the costs of accidents, an economically optimal outcome.18
When Congress creates a civil cause of action, it often does not
mention the presence, or absence, of vicarious liability. One could
interpret this silence as an indication that such principles are inappli-
cable to federal rights sounding in tort, but, as a general matter,
courts do not interpret the law so narrowly. The Supreme Court fre-
quently views statutory silence on vicarious liability principles as an
indication that Congress intended the courts to apply "traditional" or
"ordinary" principles of tort law in their interpretation. 19 In securities
law, some courts supplement the explicit statutory provisions provid-
ing for a form of vicarious liability with the traditional theory, even as
an explicit alternative provision strengthens the case for exclusion of
the traditional theory.20
the husband is not liable to the penalties; but if she obtains the property of another by
any means not felonious, he must make the payment and amends."); W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984) ("[Vica-
rious liability] means that, by reason of some relation existing between A and B, the
negligence of A is to be charged against B, although B has played no part in it, has
done nothing whatever to aid or encourage it, or indeed has done all that he possibly
can to prevent it.").
17 SeeT. BATY, VIcARIous LIABILITY 148 (1916) (listing nine asserted rationales for
vicarious liability, and surmising that it "may ... rest[] on no very firm basis of pol-
icy"); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, 5 HARv. L. REV. 1, 22 (1891) (lampooning
the concept of vicarious liability).
18 See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 543-45 (1961) (arguing that vicarious liability is economically efficient
because superiors are in the best position to insure against accidents).
19 See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) ("It is well established that tradi-
tional vicarious liability rules ordinarily make principals or employers vicariously lia-
ble for acts of their agents or employees in the scope of their authority or
employment."); id. at 286 ("Congress' silence, while permitting an inference that
Congress intended to apply ordinary background tort principles [like vicarious liabil-
ity], cannot show that it intended to apply an unusual modification of those rules.");
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760-61 (1998) (applying vicarious
liability rules specific to intentional torts in a Title VII sexual harassment suit).
20 The securities laws provide for the liability of "controlling persons." See 15
U.S.C. § 77o (2006) ("Every person who ... controls any person liable .. .shall also
be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person
... ."). Nevertheless, courts continue to apply vicarious liability to securities cases. See
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he
doctrines of respondeat superior and apparent authority remain applicable to suits
for securities fraud." (citing AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d
1421, 1429-33 (3d Cir. 1994))); Hoffend v. Villa (In reVilla), 261 F.3d 1148, 1152 n.5
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ii. Secondary Liability
The civil law theories of secondary responsibility most relevant to
a discussion of personhood at federal law also emerge from tort law.
There are two varieties of secondary liability in tort: conspiracy and
aiding and abetting. Conspiracy is an agreement between two or
more persons to act unlawfully, resulting in an injury caused by an
overt act made pursuant to, and in furtherance of, the unlawful
scheme. 21 Aiding and abetting is knowing and substantial assistance
of a party that commits an unlawful, injury-causing act, with awareness
of the principal's unlawful scheme. 22 These theories seek to reconcile
tort law's competing goals by increasing a tort victim's chances of
compensation, while restraining the scope of tort liability to only
those parties with the necessary quantum of responsibility. 23
As is the case with vicarious liability principles, Congress is not
consistent about writing aiding and abetting or conspiracy provisions
into statutes explicitly. As the Supreme Court's treatment of vicarious
liability suggests, this does not necessarily mean that theories of secon-
dary liability are inapplicable to civil causes of action arising under
federal law. As was the case with vicarious liability, there is a substan-
tial line of precedent establishing the principle that courts should
interpret statutes as incorporating generally accepted principles of
tort law whenever such incorporation serves the overall goals of the
statutory scheme. 24 This is in keeping with an older strain of thought
(11th Cir. 2001) (collecting case law supporting the use of common law agency princi-
ples as an additional form of vicarious liability in securities actions). But see Rochez
Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884 (3d Cir. 1975) (deeming application of respon-
deat superior to securities law "inappropriate" in light of the explicit provision for
controlling person liability).
21 Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (giving a four-element
formulation of civil conspiracy).
22 Id. (giving a three-element formulation of civil aiding and abetting).
23 Compare KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 1, at 5-6 (" [Tort law is that] body of
law [which] is directed toward the compensation of individuals, rather than the pub-
lic, for losses which they have suffered within the scope of their legally recognized
interests generally, rather than one interest only, where the law considers that com-
pensation is required."), with id. § 2, at 9-15 (recognizing that certain features of the
law of torts exist to "punish[] the defendant").
24 See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
709-10 (1999) (holding, in the context of a civil rights claim under § 1983, that the
Court will interpret statutes against the "'background of tort liability'" if it is apparent
that Congress has created rights sounding in tort (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 187 (1961))); Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
570 (1982) (applying the doctrine of apparent agency to the Sherman Act claim
because it is "consistent with the intent behind the antitrust laws"); Tex. Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1980) (refusing to deviate from application
200g] 2245
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in federal law that courts could go so far as to read causes of action,
much less tort principles, into federal statutes, to effectuate statutory
intent under certain conditions. 25 The question of whether particular
principles are "traditional" or "ordinary"-colloquial ways of saying
the principles are so entrenched in the legal landscape that it would
be reasonable to believe Congress presumed their inclusion-can be a
difficult one; often, reasonable answers on both sides are possible. 26
Despite this uncertainty, application of secondary liability principles
in the absence of explicit statutory authorization under federal law is
not an unreasonable proposition. 27
The Supreme Court brought this line of reasoning into question
with its decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Den-
ver.28 It held that aiding and abetting liability did not apply to civil
actions under section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 193429 because
of traditional joint and several liability principles under the Sherman Act); Nat'l Soc'y
of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (regarding the failure of
Congress to "delineate the full meaning of the statute" in the context of the Sherman
Act's "broad mandate" as an invitation for courts to "draw[ ] on common-law tradi-
tion" in order to interpret its requirements); see also supra notes 19-20 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the predisposition of federal courts to read vicarious liability
rules into statutes). This rule is particularly relevant to "remedial" statutes like the
antitrust laws, securities laws, and RICO, which traditionally receive more liberal con-
struction. See, e.g., Piedmont & N. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 286 U.S.
299, 311 (1932) (reasoning that the Transportation Act, described as "remedial" by
the Court, "requires a broader and more liberal interpretation than that to be drawn
from mere dictionary definitions of the words employed by Congress").
25 See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) ("[T]he Court has
long recognized that under certain limited circumstances the failure of Congress to
[create a cause of action] is not inconsistent with an intent on its part to have such a
remedy available to the persons benefited by its legislation."). Courts are no longer so
generous about reading causes of action into statutes. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION § 6.3.3, at 397-401 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing the more limited
modem approach taken by the Supreme Court in regard to implied causes of action).
26 Compare Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
180-85 (1994) (rejecting argument that civil aiding and abetting is such a generally
accepted notion of tort law that Congress presumes it will apply when drafting legisla-
tion), with id. at 193 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that at the time the securi-
ties laws were enacted, civil aiding and abetting was "widely, albeit not universally
recognized in the law of torts").
27 See Petro-Tech, Inc. v. W. Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1356-57 (3d Cir. 1987)
(looking to Hydrolevel and other cases to conclude that common law aiding and abet-
ting can be applied to a statute if it "advance[s] the goals of the particular federal
statute which plaintiffs allege has been violated").
28 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
29 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (2006) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange .... [t]o use or employ, in
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Congress failed to indicate explicitly that complicit parties were "per-
sons" liable under the statute. 30 When Congress fails to mention aid-
ing and abetting explicitly, the Court argued, it makes a conscious
decision not to include such liability. Had Congress wished to impose
secondary liability, it would "presum[ably] ... use[] the words 'aid'
and 'abet' in the statutory text," rather than rely on the courts to con-
strue the statute in light of background legal principles."1 The Court
failed to find persuasive the applicability of aiding and abetting liabil-
ity to criminal violators of the securities laws.32 This finding went
against decisions in every federal appeals court, in addition to the
holdings of "hundreds" of district court cases and administrative
actions by the SEC, that aider and abettor liability was an implied con-
sequence of the tort-like nature of the section 10(b) action. 33
The rule of Central Bank is not, in and of itself, a bad one. It is
unambiguous, and it places Congress on notice as to what they must
do to broaden the scope of liability. Nevertheless, these benefits do
not come without costs. Central Bank circumscribed a general under-
standing that secondary liability concepts inhered in the securities
laws. A cooperative relationship between the courts and Congress, in
which courts use background tort concepts to bridge statutory gaps
and effect congressional intent, is not the vision of Central Bank. The
choice a court makes between these competing visions of statutory
interpretation places crucial policy decisions in the hands of the
courts rather than Congress, and reflects a breakdown in the consis-
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered.., any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may pre-
scribe . . ").
30 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177 ("[T]he text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach
those who aid and abet a § 10(b) violation.... [W]e think that conclusion resolves
the case.").
31 Id. at 176-77 (citing examples of civil remedy statutes with explicit complicit
party provisions). The Court's treatment of the issue is analogous to its treatment of
implied causes of action. Id. at 190 (classifying their task as "infer[ing] a private right
of action"). As the case law on other tort law theories has shown, this categorization is
questionable, at best. See supra notes 19-20, 24 and accompanying text.
32 See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 190-91. The result is thus a curious one: a private
individual harmed by a person guilty of a criminal securities violation cannot hold that
individual liable civilly.
33 Id. at 192-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court recently reaffirmed the vital-
ity of its holding in Central Bank. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 768-69 (2008) (holding that secondary actors are liable
only if they "satisfy each of the elements or preconditions for liability" and noting
Congress' failure to respond to the decision by enacting an aiding and abetting
provision).
2009] 2247
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tency and predictability of the concept of legal personhood at federal
law.
b. Criminal Law
i. Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability is primarily relevant to the criminal law in the
context of attaching liability to entities like corporations. 34 The com-
mon law glibly asserted that corporations had "neither a body to beat
nor a soul to damn."35 The quip reflected a resistance to prosecutions
of corporations because they lacked a distinct state of mind36 and
could not stand for traditional punishment.37 Despite these theoreti-
cal issues, prosecution of corporations and municipalities for certain
strict liability offenses committed by their agents took place in many
American jurisdictions during the nineteenth century. 38
Commentators became more open to corporate liability for
crimes requiring intent near the turn of the century. 39 The watershed
34 For crimes with a scienter requirement, natural person "superiors" are typically
liable on either a conspiracy or an aiding and abetting theory. A form of vicarious
criminal liability may attach to a natural person for certain strict liability offenses
depending on their relationship to the principal offenders. See, e.g., United States v.
Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-74 (1975) (upholding the conviction of a corporate official
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, based on his "responsible relation-
ship" to violations of the law by his employees).
35 Lord Thurlow receives credit for the original quote: "Why, you never expected
justice from a company, did you? [T]hey have neither a soul to lose, nor a body to
kick." 1 LADY HOLLAND, A MEMOIR OF THE REV. SYDNEY SMITH 331 (Sarah Austin ed.,
New York, Harper & Bros. 1855) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, § 13.5, at 701-02 (4th ed. 2003) ("[A] corpo-
ration ... had no mind, and thus was incapable of the criminal intent then required
for all crimes .... ").
37 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *477 ("Neither can [a corporation] be
committed to prison; for its existence being ideal, no man can apprehend or arrest
it." (footnote omitted)).
38 See Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief Histoy and an
Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393, 404-10 (1982) (summarizing the development of
American corporate crime doctrine for strict liability crimes); Stuart P. Green, The
Criminal Prosecution of Local Governments, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (1994) ("The basic
nineteenth-century rule was that municipalities and business corporations were
immune from prosecution for crimes requiring mens rea, but subject to prosecution
for non-mens rea acts that harmed the public at large." (footnote omitted)).
39 See I JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW § 420, at 305 (John M.
Zane & Carl Zollmann eds., 9th ed. 1923) ("If... the invisible, intangible essence
which we term a corporation, can level mountains, fill up valleys, lay down iron tracks,
and run railroad cars on them,-it can intend to do it, and can act therein as well
viciously as virtuously.").
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moment for corporate crime arrived with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States,40
which recognized that Congress could impose punishment on the cor-
porate person for the acts of its agents.4 1 Today, the theory is suffi-
ciently well entrenched that a statute need not invoke corporate
liability explicitly in order for liability to attach to a corporation. 42
ii. Secondary Liability
Federal criminal law's secondary liability framework is fairly
straightforward. Title 18 of the United States Code defines complic-
ity43 and conspiracy 4 4 through statutes which apply generally to fed-
eral criminal law. These statutes apply without Congress' explicit
invocation unless Congress specifies another standard of liability.45
Courts are consistent about applying these rules to criminal provisions
outside of Title 18, like those found in the antitrust and securities
40 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
41 Id. at 494-95 (holding that for a class of crimes that "consist[ ] in purposely
doing the things prohibited by statute," there was "no good reason why corporations
may not be held responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purpose of
their agents, acting within the authority conferred upon them"). The decision
reflects the movement towards a "natural entity" theory of corporations that was in
progress in the early twentieth century. See supra note 7.
42 Kendel Drew & Kyle A. Clark, Corporate Criminal Liability, 42 Am. CRiM. L. REv.
277, 279-86 (2005) (discussing current formulations of the New York Central standard
in use today). Today, corporate "persons" are expressly included in the Dictionary
Act, and courts will presume corporate liability exists in the absence of a suggestion to
the contrary by the statute. See, e.g., United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S.
121, 123 (1958) (interpreting criminal provisions for violation of Interstate Com-
merce Commission rules without explicit inclusion of corporate persons to include a
partnership, relying on Dictionary Act). Congress enacted the modern version of the
Dictionary Act's definition of "person" contemporaneously with the federal criminal
code, and the Court in A & P Trucking found this persuasive evidence that Congress
intended to apply the code to corporations. Id. at 123 n.2 ("[T]he very same statute
which creates the crime admonish[es] that 'whoever' is to be liberally interpreted.").
43 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006) ("Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is pun-
ishable as a principal.").
44 Id. § 371 ("If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States ... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . ").
45 See United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
("Congress doesn't have to think about aider and abettor liability when it passes a new
criminal statute, because section 2(a) attaches automatically. The question is not
whether 2(a) is applicable-it always is.").
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laws.46 The primary differences between the criminal and civil secon-
dary liability rules are the lack of any result requirement and the need
for a finding that the defendant, in Learned Hand's words, had a
"stake in the venture" formed by the agreement. 47 Both differences
reflect criminal law's overriding concerns of punishing the morally
culpable and deterring socially disruptive acts, in contrast to tort law's
focus on remunerating victims.4 8
B. Interpreting the Word "Person" Under Federal Law
Congress has made some efforts to bring consistency to the defi-
nition of the term "person" across the United States Code. The pri-
mary source of guidance on this matter is the Dictionary Act's
definition of the term "person,"4 9 which is generally applicable to
every title of the U.S. Code. Within specific statutory schemes, Con-
gress may attempt to define with greater specificity the class of persons
bound or liable. These two features, taken together, provide a rudi-
mentary guide for resolving personhood questions raised by federal
statutes.
Congress first defined the term "person" in the initial version of
the Dictionary Act, passed in 1871.50 The Act stipulated that "the
word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corpo-
rate" throughout federal law, "unless the context shows that such
words were intended to be used in a more limited sense."51 An 1874
recodification of the Act stipulated that "the word 'person' may
46 See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
190 (1994) (noting that those who aid and abet a criminal violation of the securities
laws violate 18 U.S.C. § 2); United States v. MMR Corp., 907 F.2d 489, 492 (5th Cir.
1990) (upholding a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2 for aiding and abetting a Sherman
Act violation).
47 United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.) ("[In
prosecutions for conspiracy or abetting, [the defendant's] attitude towards the forbid-
den undertaking must be more positive .... [H]e must in some sense promote their
venture himself, make it his own, have a stake in its outcome.").
48 See LAFAvE, supra note 36, § 1.2(e)-(f), at 13-14 (discussing the basic animat-
ing principles of criminal law).
49 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
50 Dictionary Act, ch. 71, 16 Star. 431 (1871) (current version at 1 U.S.C. § 1).
51 Id. The language represented an understanding on the part of at least some
members of Congress that legal personhood extended well beyond natural persons.
See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 752 (1871) ("[C]ounties, cities, and corpora-
tions of all sorts, after years ofjudicial conflict, have become thoroughly established to
be an individual or person or entity of the personal existence, of which, as a citizen,
individual, or inhabitant, the United States Constitution does take note and endow
with faculty to sue and be sued in the courts of the United States." (citing Louisville,
Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844))). This
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extend and be applied to partnerships and corporations.., unless the
context shows that such words were intended to be used in a more
limited sense .... "52 Congress restyled the language again in 1948
into the modern definition: "[U]nless the context, indicates other-
wise ... the words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations, com-
panies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock
companies, as well as individuals .... ,53
A careful reading of the Dictionary Act shows how its definition
should impact statutory interpretation. The phrase "unless the con-
text indicates otherwise" allows other statutes, either implicitly or
explicitly, to modify the breadth of the term "person." "Context"
refers to the surrounding statutory language and similar statutes,
rather than other tools of statutory interpretation with looser connec-
tions to the text.54 This "context" need only "indicat[e]" such a
seems to reflect the trend of this particular historical period toward a greater level of
openness about the personhood of fictional entities.
52 REV. STAT. § 1 (1874) (current version at 1 U.S.C. § 1). The legislative history
suggests that the change arose out of a concern that sovereigns would be included as
"persons" by default. 1 REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES STATUTES AS DRAFTED BY THE
COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED FOR THAT PURPOSE, at tit. 1, ch. III, sec. 22 (1872) (sug-
gesting that the commissioners changed the definition of the term "person" to head
off a presumption that the term "body politic" included the sovereign, a rule that
would require drafters to explicitly exclude the states, the federal government, and
foreign nations from liability whenever such an outcome was inappropriate). Today,
the rule of statutory construction that "sovereigns are not persons" is pervasive. See,
e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780
(2000) ("We must apply to this text our longstanding interpretive presumption that
'person' does not include the sovereign.").
While the concerns of the drafters of the Revised Statutes are certainly valid, the
"sovereigns are not persons" presumption leads to redundancy by taking sovereigns
out of the class of "persons liable" regardless of whether the immunity protections are
valid. For example, the Supreme Court held in a civil rights suit against a state police
department that even when sovereign immunity is not formally at issue, a state
remains immune from suit because of the "sovereigns are not persons" rule. See Will
v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (ruling that a state agency which
consented to suit in state court is not a "person" under the civil rights laws). The
Court reasoned that the immunity protections which were supposedly inapplicable
because of the choice of a state forum nonetheless should channel the interpretation
of the word "person" and limit the scope of its applicability. See id. at 66-67 ("[11n
deciphering congressional intent as to the scope of [the civil rights laws], the scope of
the Eleventh Amendment is a consideration, and we decline to adopt a reading of
[them] that disregards it.").
53 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 6, 62 Stat. 683, 859 (codified as amended at 1
U.S.C. § 1).
54 Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199 (1993) ("'Context' here
means the text of the Act of Congress surrounding the word at issue, or the texts of
other related congressional Acts . . ").
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change by "rais[ing] a specter short of inanity ... with something less
than syllogistic force. ' 55 Second, the definition is open-ended. It
"include[s]" the categories listed, but does not necessarily exclude
potential legal persons that are not on the list.56
Some major statutory schemes have gone well beyond "indicat-
ing" another meaning of the word "person" by defining it separately.57
These definitions range from the compact and open-ended 58 to the
exhaustive and exclusive. 59 No matter how Congress chooses to elabo-
rate on what it means by the term "person," the rules of interpretation
remain the same. The content of the Dictionary Act is subject to
expansion or restriction if the "context" of the particular statute,
including its definition of the term "person," "indicates" that this is
appropriate. The open-ended and malleable nature of the term "per-
son" in federal law means that close personhood questions rarely have
one overwhelmingly persuasive answer. As this Note's "test suite"
attempts to demonstrate, the current scheme leads to ambiguity and
uncertainty in statutory interpretation and frustrates the Dictionary
Act's ambitions.
II. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER RICO: A TEST SUITE
Having the proper theoretical understanding of how to interpret
the term "person" is important, but it is insufficient if one wishes to
develop a full understanding of how personhood analysis works.
Heuristically, one must deploy the framework on an actual problem in
55 Id. at 201; see also Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978) ("The
word 'person' . . . is not a term of art with a fixed meaning wherever it is used.").
56 See Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108, 112 (1959) (observing that when a
definition uses the word "includes," the question of whether or not a state is a person
"cannot be abstractly declared," but must be discerned from the "legislative environ-
ment"); Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1 (1934) ("[T]he verb
'includes' imports a general class, some of whose particular instances are those speci-
fied in the definition."). Congress' liberal approach to the class of statutory "persons"
stands in stark contrast to Central Bank's basically negative stance on the implication
of tort theories, another internally contradictory feature in this area of statutory
interpretation.
57 For some typical examples, see 15 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (antitrust), id. § 77b(a) (2)
(Exchange Act of 1934), and 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (2006) (RICO).
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) ("[The term] 'person' [under RICO] includes any indi-
vidual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property ..
(emphasis added)).
59 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2006) ("The term 'person' [under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA of 1980)]
means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint
venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commis-
sion, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." (emphasis added)).
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order to reveal its inadequacies and to show how courts resolve
problems when they encounter ambiguities (if they choose to deal
with them at all). As a way of running the "personhood" framework
through a real-life problem, this Part of the Note will analyze the sta-
tus of municipalities as "persons" within the scope of the RICO
statute.6
0
There are good reasons for choosing this particular problem as a
test suite. RICO is part of a loose family of "remedial" statutory
schemes. While popularly classed as a "criminal" statute, RICO is actu-
ally a hybrid of criminal and civil law. Analysis of a RICO problem
should thus be readily applicable to other statutory regimes, including
antitrust law, securities law, civil rights law, and environmental law,
that take a similar approach to addressing other difficult policy
problems. Proper interpretation of RICO thus requires recourse to
both civil and criminal law concepts. Examining municipal "persons"
is advantageous because they constitute a "borderline" case under cur-
rent law that will make some of the inadequacies of the present frame-
work more apparent.
A. The Problem
New York Central and the Dictionary Act make corporations poten-
tial criminal defendants under federal law. This has not been the case
with regard to municipalities and other local governmental units
which do not enjoy any form of sovereign immunity. Federal cases
involving prosecution of municipalities are extraordinarily rare. 6'
60 RICO sets out its scheme of liability in three steps. First, it defines five central
concepts: "racketeering activity," "person," "enterprise," "pattern," and "unlawful
debt." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), (3)-(6) (2006). Second, it describes three unlawful rela-
tionships between "persons" engaged either in "patterns" of "racketeering activity" or
in the collection of "unlawful debt," and the "enterprises" through which such "per-
sons" work-investing in the "enterprise," acquiring an interest or control in the
"enterprise," and conducting "enterprise" affairs. Id. § 1962(a)-(c). It also prohibits
conspiracy to engage in this behavior. Id. § 1962(d). Finally, it sets out a comprehen-
sive set of criminal and civil penalties for such behavior. Id. §§ 1963-1964.
61 See Green, supra note 38, at 1212-14 (explaining why state criminal prosecu-
tion of municipalities declined after the nineteenth century). At the time his article
was published, Professor Green could only identify two attempted federal prosecu-
tions of municipalities in the case reporters. See United States v. City of Rancho Palos
Verdes, 841 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the defendant municipality
was not liable under the Endangered Species Act, but that such liability might be
possible if Congress provided more explicit authorization); United States v. Little
Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. 6, 8-10 (E.D. Ark. 1978) (holding a municipal sewer
agency liable for filing a fraudulent pollution-discharge report with the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency); see also Green, supra note 38, at 1222 (citing these cases). This
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Nevertheless, curious minds continue to ask, "Why not municipal lia-
bility?" 62 RICO has been a frequent avenue for these questions
because it opens the possibility of civil remedies for those harmed by
systematic governmental corruption that would be plainly criminal if
pursued by private groups.63 A number of academic articles propose
the use of RICO to target police corruption, 64 and civil plaintiffs have
made numerous attempts to plead RICO against government agen-
cies. 65 Yet, for the most part, little systematic analysis usually goes into
determining (a) whether municipalities are "persons" under the stat-
ute, and (b) whether a theory of liability exists to tie them to the
unlawful behavior RICO describes.
B. Are Municipalities RICO "Persons"?
Proper analysis begins with the statutory terms. The Dictionary
Act does not list municipalities as "persons," but does not exclude
them, either.66 RICO's definition of a "person,"67 which is tied to the
ability to hold property, is certainly broad enough to include a munic-
ipality on its face, even though it does not mention them explicitly.
Some statutory schemes that mix criminal and civil remedies, includ-
ing the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) of 198068 and the securities laws,69 make a
point of mentioning municipalities explicitly. One could plausibly
argue from this sparse evidence that RICO does not intend to make
municipalities "persons." Even though RICO's definition is open-
author knows of no new prosecutions of municipalities since the publication of
Green's article.
62 See Green, supra note 38, at 1214-15 (inquiring whether the current contents
of the federal criminal code can be reasonably construed to include municipalities).
63 The presence of civil penalties circumvents the "no body to beat" problem that
generally precludes criminal liability for legal persons like municipalities and corpora-
tions. See supra note 37.
64 See, e.g., Steven P. Ragland, Comment, Using the Master's Tools: Fighting Persistent
Police Misconduct with Civil RICO, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 139, 146 (2001) (arguing that civil
RICO is an "appropriate and justified" measure to combat municipal corruption);
Michael Rowan, Comment, Leaving No Stone Unturned: Using RICO as a Remedy for Police
Misconduct, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 231, 238 (2003) (arguing for the use of RICO in
combating police corruption).
65 See infra notes 89, 100 (listing cases).
66 See supra notes 53, 56 and accompanying text.
67 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (2006).
68 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006); see supra note 59.
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (9) (2006) ("The term 'person' means a natural person,
company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a
government.").
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ended, it is by no means obvious that it covers municipalities, espe-
cially considering the low ebb at which municipal crime rests at pre-
sent.7 0 If Congress intended such a novel use, it certainly had the
authority to mention municipalities explicitly in the statutory
definition. 71
While this is certainly a plausible conclusion, it is not necessarily
the best construction of the statute. The Supreme Court concluded
that the term "person" includes municipalities in two analogous statu-
tory schemes imposing civil liability for conduct also punishable by
criminal sanctions. In Monell v. Department of Social Services,72 the
Supreme Court found that municipalities were "persons" within the
scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.73 Section 1983, the primary statute for
bringing civil rights claims under federal law, does not define the
term "person" separately. After a close analysis of older versions of the
Dictionary Act, which came into force at roughly the same time § 1983
did, the Court concluded that the language "bodies politic and corpo-
rate" in the original version of the Act7 4 was broad enough to include
a municipal agency.75 An even more compelling analogy emerges
from antitrust.76 RICO and antitrust are closely analogous in terms of
their goals and remedial structure. Like RICO, antitrust's definition
70 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
71 While this is an argument about the scope of the term "person," rather than
the applicability of tort theories, the echoes of Central Bank are certainly audible in
this argument. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
72 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
73 Id. at 701. Monell overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which held
that municipalities enjoyed blanket immunity from § 1983 claims. Monell, 436 U.S. at
663 ("[W]e now overrule Monroe... insofar as it holds that local governments are
wholly immune from suit under § 1983."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) ("Every
person... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ...." (emphasis added)).
74 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
75 Today's language does not suggest a "municipality" as strongly as it did in the
past. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing the change in language).
Congress' decision to change the language seems motivated by a desire to avoid an
impasse with sovereign immunity doctrine. See supra note 52. This is not really an
issue for municipalities, which have never enjoyed sovereign immunity of their own
right. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.54 (sketching briefly the inapplicability of constitu-
tionally based sovereign immunity to municipalities).
76 RICO and antitrust are very close analogues. See G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P.
Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Impact on Substantive,
Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1345,
1349 n.4 (1996) ("As the antitrust laws seek to maintain economic freedom in the
market place, so, too, RICO seeks to promote integrity in the marketplace, physical or
fiscal.").
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of person is open-ended and inclusive. 77 On numerous occasions, the
Supreme Court has held that the term "person" in the antitrust con-
text is broad enough to encompass a municipality. 78 Monell and the
antitrust cases are both persuasive authority for believing that a
municipality can serve as a RICO "person."
In RICO cases where municipal liability has been at issue, courts
have not paid much attention to the question of whether municipali-
ties are "persons" in the abstract. Those cases that have raised the
issue typically note that the language of the statue is broad enough on
its face to include a municipality, but do not attempt to probe any
deeper than this.79 Rather, they challenge the personhood of munici-
palities on the grounds of liability theories, as the next subpart
discusses.
C. Does a Theory of Liability Exist to Attach Municipalities?
It is not sufficient to argue that municipalities fit within the statu-
tory definition of the term "person." Unless a theory of liability exists
to attach the person to the offense charged, RICO effectively does not
apply to municipalities. If RICO were purely a civil cause of action,
this would be unproblematic. When interpreting other statutory
schemes employing a mixture of criminal and civil sanctions to
achieve remedial ends, including civil rights, 80 antitrust,8 ' and securi-
77 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (2006) ("The word 'person' or 'persons' wherever used in
this Act shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or
authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories,
the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.").
78 See, e.g., Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 (1982)
(affirming that the antitrust laws "apply to municipalities as well as to other corporate
entities"); City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 395 (1978) ("Since
the Court has held that the definition of 'person' or 'persons' embraces both cities
and States, it is understandable that the cities do not argue that they are not 'persons'
within the meaning of the antitrust laws."); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396-97 (1906) (acknowledging that municipalities are
persons who can bring antitrust claims).
79 See, e.g., Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1378 (4th Cir. 1991)
("[T]he RICO statute ... contains language broad enough to include municipal cor-
porations."); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 784 F. Supp. 1275, 1283 (E.D.
Mich. 1992) ("Because a municipal corporation is capable of holding legal or benefi-
cial property in Michigan, [it] qualifies as a 'person' for the purposes of RICO."). But
see Smallwood v.Jefferson County Gov't, 743 F. Supp. 502, 504 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (argu-
ing that since municipalities are incapable of forming mens rea, they cannot be classi-
fied as "persons" under RICO).
80 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 688-89 (1978) (concluding that
municipalities are subject to certain forms of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
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ties, 82 the courts have allowed municipal liability, or, at the very least,
not rejected it categorically. RICO, by contrast, requires the applica-
tion of criminal standards of liability. Saying that a municipality can
be liable under RICO is essentially equivalent to charging municipali-
ties with crimes. Is this permissible?
Vicarious liability theory provides a potentially viable path for
assigning crimes to municipalities. Criminal law treated municipali-
ties more or less like corporations during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.83 Despite the historical similarities between
these two artificial entities, New York Central did not result in the rise
of widespread municipal crime; on the contrary, there was retrench-
ment.8 4 Nevertheless, New York Centrars holding that criminal intent
can attach to a corporation seems easily applicable to a municipality.
8 5
Municipal liability under RICO is arguably more equitable to the
defendant than it is under similar schemes because New York Central
requires the imputation of criminal intent to the municipality in order
for RICO civil liability to attach. Under federal law, this typically
classifying them as "'bodies corporate and politic'" under the original language of
the Dictionary Act (quoting Dictionary Act, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431 (1871))).
81 Cmty. Commcns Co., 455 U.S. at 56-57 (affirming the district court's grant of
preliminary injunctive relief against a municipality for an ordinance it passed that
allegedly restrained trade). At the time, opponents of the decision in Community Com-
munications feared it would open the door to treble damages liability for municipali-
ties. See id. at 65 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It will take a considerable feat of
judicial gymnastics to conclude that municipalities are not subject to treble damages
...."). But see id. at 58-60 (Stevens, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the apocalyptic
views of the dissenters on the case's significance). Congress' response was to amend
the antitrust laws to prevent treble damage suits against municipalities, but not to give
them total immunity for measures taken in violation of the antitrust laws. See Local
Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (2006)). No similar provision exists for RICO.
82 Sonnenfeld v. City & County of Denver, 100 F.3d 744, 746-47 (10th Cir. 1996)
(enforcing a section 10(b) action against municipal defendants on the basis of their
inclusion in the statutory definition of "person" in the securities laws); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (2006) (defining "person" for the purposes of section 10(b)
actions).
83 See Green, supra note 38, at 1203 ("Cases involving the criminal liability of
business corporations were regularly cited as support in decisions and scholarly trea-
tises involving the criminal liability of local governments and vice versa." (footnote
omitted)).
84 See id. at 1213-14 (speculating on why municipal prosecutions declined in the
twentieth century).
85 Id. at 1225 ("Outside the criminal law, intentions, motives, and other mental
states are regularly attributed to governmental entities.").
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means a finding of knowing violations of the law.8 6 The Supreme
Court applied a similar approach to municipalities charged with civil
rights violations.8 7 By contrast, regimes like securities law impose civil
sanctions with a lower degree of scienter, closer to recklessness or neg-
ligence.88 Thus, municipal liability under RICO seems not only plau-
sible, but more equitable than comparable methods of imposing
liability on municipalities already recognized by the courts.
Despite the plausibility of these arguments, most courts that have
dealt with RICO claims have failed to even acknowledge them, much
less engage them. The most common response of courts presented
with RICO claims is to fall back on the pre-New York Central fiction
that a municipality is incapable of forming the criminal intent neces-
sary to violate RICO.8 9 None of these cases make an effort to discuss
New York Central or other potentially relevant statutory schemes.
There is no relevant precedent that "compels the conclusion that
municipalities are per se immune from prosecution" for crimes with a
86 See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 408 (1980) ("[T]he cases have gener-
ally held that, except in narrow classes of offenses, proof that the defendant acted
knowingly is sufficient to support a conviction.").
87 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) ("Congress did not
intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal
policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.").
88 Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, "You've Got Jail": Current Trends in Civil
and Criminal Enforcement of Internet Securities Fraud, 38 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 405, 416
(2001) (differentiating between civil securities proceedings, which require a showing
of "recklessness," and criminal securities proceedings, which require a showing of
"willful" activity).
89 See, e.g., Pedrina v. Chun, 97 F.3d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting munici-
pal liability claims out of hand on criminal intent grounds (citing Lancaster Cmty.
Hosp. v. Antelope Val. Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 404 (9th Cir. 1991))); Brubaker v.
City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363,1378 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal of a RICO
claim against the city, but denying a Rule 11 motion to impose sanctions on the attor-
neys who brought the claim); Lancaster Cmty. Hosp., 940 F.2d at 404 ("The RICO
claims against [municipal hospital operators] fail because government entities are
incapable of forming a malicious intent."); Interstate Flagging, Inc. v. Town of
Darien, 283 F. Supp. 2d 641, 646 (D. Conn. 2003) ("[T]he Municipal Defendants
cannot be held liable under Section 1962(b) because the Municipal Defendants can-
not have the requisite criminal intent."); County of Oakland by Kuhn v. City of
Detroit, 784 F. Supp. 1275, 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1992) ("[I]t is doubtful that a municipal
corporation can form the requisite [specific] intent."); D.H. Blair & Co. v. City of N.Y.
(In re CitiSource, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 694 F. Supp. 1069, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("The
issue of intent is the Achilles' heel of the plaintiff seeking to impose RICO liability
upon a municipal corporation .... Unlike an ordinary corporation, a municipal
corporation is incapable of the criminal intent necessary to support the alleged predi-
cate offenses." (citation omitted)); see also Green, supra note 38, at 1223 n.163 (listing
cases).
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state of mind requirement under federal law,90 and cases do not
attempt to cite such precedent. These arguments effectively under-
mine the broad definition of "person" in the text of the statute by
imposing a restrictive and unimaginative legal fiction upon an entire
class of legal entities. Moreover, the result is inconsistent with other
"remedial" statutory schemes used to impose liability on municipali-
ties, such as antitrust and securities.
The result of this interpretation is also thorny from a textual per-
spective. RICO does not distinguish between "persons" who can bring
RICO claims, and "persons" who can violate RICO. 9' Since municipal-
ities cannot violate RICO, even though they fit under the statutory
definition of the term "person," one must argue that the meaning of
the term "person" shifts depending on its use in the statute, a distinc-
tion that appears neither in the Dictionary Act nor in RICO itself. Of
course, those cases construing the term "person" establish that one is
not inexorably bound to read the term consistently between uses,
even when this tortures the text of the statute.9 2 This is the approach
the courts adopt in the majority of cases.
In United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nos-
tra,93 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals demonstrated the degree of
confusion a unified definition of the term "person" can create when
judges are unwilling to suspend textualist disbelief in statutory con-
struction. The defendant, an organized crime family, challenged the
ability of the United States to bring a treble damages claim against
them.94 The court held that since the United States was immune from
suit for a violation of RICO, 95 it was also therefore not a "person"
capable of suing for treble damages unless it met the high threshold
of waiver of sovereign immunity.96 This result appeared to contradict
90 Green, supra note 38, at 1223.
91 See supra note 12.
92 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
93 879 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1989).
94 Id. at 21.
95 Id. at 22-23. Since the United States is immune from suit unless it gives an
explicit waiver, and RICO contains no such waiver, the United States could not be a
RICO "person," because "[t]he disadvantage of being a 'person' within the meaning
of RICO is that it subjects qualifying entities to the powerful and expansive criminal
and civil liability provisions of the Act." Id.
96 See id. at 27 (reasoning, in part from RICO's failure to explicitly waive sover-
eign immunity, that the United States could not be a person for purposes of violating
RICO). The court took into consideration two other factors, as well. First, it found
strongly persuasive United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941), which came to a
similar holding in the context of the Clayton Act. See Bonanno, 879 F.2d at 23 (recit-
ing and agreeing with the Court's reasoning in Cooper Corp.). Second, it relied heavily
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RICO's plain authorization of "actions" under its civil remedies sec-
tion brought by "the Attorney General, '9 7 and the apparent efforts of
Congress to draft around malignant antitrust precedent which denied
the federal government the power to sue for treble damages. 98 Never-
theless, the court placed maintenance of a consistent definition of the
term "person" as a virtue in statutory interpretation above rendering
that section of the statute effective. 99 Thus, if Bonanno's reasoning
governs in a circuit adhering to the "municipalities cannot form crimi-
nal intent" logic, a municipality would theoretically be incapable of
bringing RICO treble damages claims as a price of their immunity
from suit.10 0
It is not necessary for courts to lean on these old legal fictions.
Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp.,1° 1 a case out of the Third Circuit, posits
a more nuanced view of municipal liability. The court, while
refraining from ruling on the issue definitively, declined to dismiss a
on structural features of RICO which it claimed militated against providing the fed-
eral government with treble damages. See id. at 24-25.
97 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (2006) ("The Attorney General may institute proceedings
under [the civil remedies] section."); see also id. § 1961(10) (giving broad definition
of "Attorney General").
98 See Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. at 614 (rejecting the federal government's attempt to
bring treble damages action for an antitrust violation and asserting that "the text of
the [Sherman] Act, taken in its natural and ordinary sense, makes against the exten-
sion of the term 'person' to include the United States . . . ."), superseded by statute, 15
U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006) (granting the federal government the right to sue for treble
damages, but not altering the statutory definition of "person").
99 Bonanno, 879 F.2d at 23-24. The court further bolstered its interpretation by
pointing to the general hesitancy on the part of the courts to construe statutes in a
manner that confers additional remedies on the government. Id. at 22. Finally, the
court examined RICO's legislative history as further evidence of Congress' intent to
deny the treble damages remedy to the federal government. Id. at 26-27.
100 Courts have not given Bonanno uncritical acceptance. See, e.g., European
Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 489-92 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (declining to
hold, in line with Bonanno, that sovereigns must be able to stand as RICO defendants
since prior cases held they were "persons" capable of asserting a RICO claim). A
similar pattern has emerged in considering state agencies. Compare Ill. Dep't of Reve-
nue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 314-17 (7th Cir. 1985) (allowing suit by a state agency
under treble damages provisions of RICO), with Fiore v. Kelly Run Sanitation, Inc.,
609 F. Supp. 909, 912 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (reasoning that, in the absence of specific
inclusion of states in the definition of the term "person," a state or state agency could
not stand as a RICO defendant). There is no dispute that foreign sovereigns are
RICO "persons," despite their general immunity from suit. See, e.g., Republic of the
Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he Republic as a
governmental body is a person . . . . The foreign nature of the Republic does not
deprive it of statutory personhood." (citation omitted)).
101 937 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1991).
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plaintiffs RICO treble damages claim against Gloucester Township,
New Jersey, on the basis of the municipality's inability to form crimi-
nal intent.10 2 It criticized other courts for their failure to grapple with
the basic doctrinal problems underlying municipal liability,103 and
engaged in a favorable discussion of the rationales behind classifying
municipalities as "persons" capable of criminal acts, including the
strongly persuasive precedent of New York Central.'04 Ultimately, the
court upheld the lower court's dismissal on the grounds that RICO's
treble damages provisions were "punitive" and thus inapplicable to a
municipality, a more palatable grounds for decision. 10 5
Genty is valuable not because of its underwhelming result, but
because of its more thoughtful approach to the personhood question,
as compared to the majority of other courts that have considered the
issue. Absent more pointed direction in a criminal statute that it is
inapplicable to municipal persons (like a crime that is only punishable
by a prison sentence), there will be many situations where the federal
law framework for determining the content of the term "person"
strongly suggests inclusion of municipalities. Nonetheless, as the per-
functory dismissal of RICO claims claiming that municipalities
engaged in criminal behavior suggest, there is little willingness to
102 Id. at 910.
103 Id. at 909.
104 Id. at 909-10.
105 Id. at 914. The Supreme Court has held in the context of private civil rights
lawsuits that municipalities are not subject to "punitive" damages because such liabil-
ity would run against innocent taxpayers. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) ("Damages awarded for punitive purposes, therefore, are not
sensibly assessed against the governmental entity itself."). At least one scholar con-
tends that RICO's treble damages provisions are not punitive. See G. Robert Blakey,
Of Characterization and Other Matters: Thoughts About Multiple Damages, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1997, at 97, 118-19 (arguing that treble damages, given the practical
realities of settlement and litigation expenses, tend to produce an average damages
award that is roughly compensatory); cf Lawrence Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under
the Anti-Trust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L.J. 117, 157-58 (1940) ("[C]losely
analyzed, the threefold damage provision [in antitrust] is ...compensatory in its
nature .... It is a penalty upon the defendant only in the loose sense of penalty as
signifying a burden encountered by the defendant as a consequence of his wrongdo-
ing."). A successful argument along these lines, combined with Genty's reasoning on
a municipality's ability to demonstrate criminal intent, would make municipal liability
under RICO theoretically possible. Regardless of the correct classification of treble
damages, municipalities would still be subject to RICO's wide-ranging equitable reme-
dies under Genty's analysis, but not under the presumption that municipalities cannot
have criminal intent imputed to them. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2006) (listing the
arsenal of civil RICO remedies in addition to the treble damages remedy).
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reach beyond the outmoded doctrines which long prevented imputa-
tion of criminal scienter to corporations.
In addition to direct vicarious liability, one could also argue that
a municipality is vicariously liable for secondary participation in a
RICO violation, either as a conspirator, or as an aider and abettor of
another's substantive RICO violation. RICO has its own conspiracy
provision, 10 6 but no parallel definition for aiding and abetting exists.
The argument in favor of imposing such liability is that an additional
provision is not necessary, because 18 U.S.C. § 2 defines the relevant
standard of complicity for criminal violations, and this standard
should govern any violation under Title 18 of the U.S. Code, regard-
less of whether the action takes place on the criminal or civil side of
the bench.
The leading appellate court case on this issue, Rolo v. City Invest-
ing Co. Liquidating Trust,10 7 rejects this approach. 10 8 First, the court
rejected the applicability of criminal aiding and abetting standards to
the case and chose to frame RICO aiding and abetting claims filed by
civil plaintiffs as governed by civil principles of secondary liability,
rather than criminal ones.10 9 Second, it concluded that the interpre-
tive rule of Central Bank with regard to secondary liability rendered
aiding and abetting a dead letter under RICO.110 While RICO does
106 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2006). RICO's definition of conspiracy removes the
"overt act" requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 371, the standard federal criminal conspiracy
statute.
107 155 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1998).
108 Id. at 656.
109 See id. at 657 ("Criminal liability for aiding and abetting a violation of § 1962 is
imposed by reference to the general aiding and abetting statute .... This provision
has no application to private causes of action."). In most statutes, the choice between
criminal and civil standards of secondary liability is straightforward. RICO adds
another level of complexity because it is not obvious whether one should apply civil or
criminal standards of secondary liability to civil actions. Congress enacted Title 18 as
a unified whole, meaning the concepts of § 2 apply to civil actions to the extent they
are capable of doing so, in the absence of an indication to the contrary. See Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 645, pmbl., 62 Stat. 683, 683 ("Title 18 of the United States Code
• .. is hereby revised, codified, and enacted into positive law, and may be cited as 'Title 18,
U.S.C., § -'..... (emphasis added)). In the context of conspirator liability under
RICO, the Supreme Court embraced this conclusion. See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S.
494, 500-01 & n.6 (2000) (concluding that civil conspiracy rules apply in determina-
tion of whether individual has a legally cognizable injury, and criminal conspiracy
rules apply in determination of whether the defendant violated RICO).
110 Ro/o, 155 F.3d at 657 ("We conclude that the same analysis [the Supreme
Court employed in Central Bank] controls our construction of the civil RICO provi-
sion . . . ."); see also De Falco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 330 (2d Cir. 2001) (following
Central Bank and invalidating civil RICO action premised on an aiding and abetting
theory). Ro/o overruled two cases decided prior to Central Bank that upheld aiding
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not have the extensive history of aiding and abetting liability that
existed under the securities laws,' 11 Rolo's reasoning shares in the
shortcomings of Central Bank's unduly narrow approach to statutory
interpretation. Behavior that subjects defendants to criminal RICO
penalties is exempt from civil remedies of any sort under RICO on the
negative reasoning that whenever Congress fails to mention some-
thing, it must be excluded. Like other remedial statutes, RICO merits
a liberal reading" 2 and ignoring the federal courts' past practice of
filling in the blanks when Congress creates a cause of action arguably
undermines those aims.
D. What Does Congress Want?
At every juncture of this analysis, difficult questions have arisen
regarding the status of municipalities as legal "persons." Are munici-
palities within the scope of the statutory definitions? If Congress
made them persons capable of violating the law, what theory of liabil-
ity exists to attach them? Did Congress intend the term "person" to
have meanings that shift during statutory interpretation? Do theories
of secondary liability exist that bring municipalities within the scope
of liability? Plausible answers to all of these questions exist on both
sides of the ledger. The conclusion to draw from this analysis is that
the term "person" is inadequate to describe the number of concepts
forced upon it in an unambiguous and systematic manner. It is a
waste of resources for courts to spend so much time litigating ques-
tions that Congress could resolve in a straightforward manner before
the fact, if only it paid closer attention to what it was doing.
and abetting liability under RICO. SeeJaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co.,
46 F.3d 258, 270 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Civil RICO liability for aiding and abetting advances
RICO's goal of permitting recovery from anyone who has committed the predicate
offenses, 'regardless of how he committed them."' (quoting Petro-Tech, Inc. v. W. Co.
of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1357 (3d Cir. 1987))); United States v. Local 30, United
Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, Damp & Waterproof Workers Ass'n, 871 F.2d 401,
406 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding, in a civil RICO litigation brought by the federal govern-
ment to restructure a labor union, that the executive board of the union was liable for
aiding and abetting the RICO offenses of an organized crime group).
111 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
112 Moreover, RICO explicitly calls for liberal interpretation of its provisions to
effect the statute's overriding goals. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91452, tit. 9, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 ("The provisions of this title shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.").
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III. CAN WE Do BETrER? SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Personhood is a vital legal category; nevertheless, like most legal
categories, it quickly loses traction if it begins to carry more content
than it can bear. Can Congress make the definition more coherent
from statute to statute, or even within a statute? Proposals for "federal
rules of statutory interpretation" are not novel)' 3 Indeed, the Dic-
tionary Act itself reflects an effort on the part of Congress to provide
courts with some consistent basis for analyzing key provisions in a stat-
ute. This Part of the Note will propose two changes to the definition
of the term person that would provide courts with better guidance in
determining "the lineup" of entities and individuals described by the
word "person."
A. "Close Up" and Separate the Definition of "Person"
The current language of the Dictionary Act has two central flaws.
First, its open-endedness and ambiguity are poor qualities for a statute
written with the intent of bringing precision and clarity to statutory
drafting and interpretation. Second, the policy differences between
making a particular person a plaintiff or a defendant are sufficiently
great that it is difficult to justify a unitary definition for both concepts.
A potentially useful restyling of the Dictionary Act could, as an alter-
native, provide separate, closed-ended definitions (like that seen in
CERCLA) 114 of who is a "person liable," and who is a "person with the
right to assert claims." Further division into groups subject to crimi-
nal and civil liability would increase the definition's utility. These
default sets could then be enlarged, restricted, or ignored by particu-
lar statutes as Congress saw fit for each statutory scheme.
Consider how a better scheme for defining the term "person"
would impact the test suite discussed above. A definition of the term
"person" that was both explicit about the classes of persons it
addressed, and that separated the concepts of which persons can be
held liable under it and which are merely permitted to bring claims,
would solve many of the problems in the test suite without recourse to
complex arguments about statutory construction. The borderline
question about whether a municipality is a "person" would no longer
be present. Separating out the class of entities liable from those with
the capacity to sue would substantially ease the conflict of interpreta-
113 See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation,
115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002) (encouraging Congress to be more proactive in giving
guidance to the courts on matters of statutory interpretation).
114 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2006).
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tional methodologies that currently troubles the courts when the dual
policy aims of the term "person," as used today, are in conflict.
Explicit definitions of who can and cannot be liable would serve as a
powerful antidote to the tendency of the courts to fall back on legal
fictions like the inability of entities to form mens rea. Conversely, if
Congress' intent is to the contrary, it would save the court system the
hassle of hearing and dismissing the futile efforts of plaintiffs attempt-
ing to sue untouchable entities. Precise rules are not always appropri-
ate in the law, but when it comes to a fairly limited problem like
personhood, there is no excuse for failing to develop a solution that is
simple to apply and leads to certain answers.
B. End the Guessing Game About Vicarious and Secondary Liability
The Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank symbolized an
important shift in the way federal courts treat claims of civil liability
outside of the principal offenders. Unless a statute makes explicit pro-
visions for the civil liability of parties that are complicit in or conspire
to violate the law, the Court will not read such liability into a statute,
even in the sweeping, remedial context of securities law. 115 Lower
courts do not view Central Bank as limited to the securities aiding and
abetting context, but as a particular application of a broader principle
of statutory construction. They have extended its reasoning to strike
down claims of civil conspiracy under section 10(b).116 Central Bank
also appears to have implications for the tradition of inferring vicari-
ous liability for 10(b) actions alongside the provisions for "controlling
person" liability.' 1 7 The decision's impact has expanded into other
statutory schemes, as well. The test suite shows how Central Bank has
affected the approach of the courts toward RICO. 118 Recently, the
Second Circuit strongly suggested that the principles of Central Bank
preclude civil rights aiding and abetting claims, even though such
115 See supra Part I.A.2.a.ii.
116 Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 135 F.3d 837, 841
(2d Cir. 1998) ("[E]very court to have addressed the viability of a conspiracy cause of
action under [section] 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 in the wake of Central Bank has agreed
that Central Bank precludes such a cause of action."). But see Wenneman v. Brown, 49
F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1289 n.3 (D. Utah 1999) (contending that conspiracy and aiding
and abetting are sufficiently distinct and that conspiracy liability under section 10(b)
should continue after Central Bank).
117 See supra note 20.
118 See supra Part II.C.
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activity would constitute a criminal violation of the civil rights laws." 19
The decision's impact on antitrust law remains an open issue, but it is
difficult to fathom that the theory of aiding and abetting liability
under antitrust 120 would survive in the wake of Central Bank. The
Supreme Court does not appear to recognize the tension between its
application of certain tort principles without explicit statutory lan-
guage 121 and its holding in Central Bank. While the case may seem
innocuous on the surface, the principles of statutory construction
articulated in Central Bank suggest a far-reaching impact on federal
law. For instance, the Seventh Circuit recently extended Central
Bank's rule to cover the terrorism cause of action under title 18. 122
To stem the tide of Central Bank-or, in the alternative, to elimi-
nate any ambiguity as to whether or not the case reflects congressional
intent-Congress should exercise its power to channel statutory inter-
pretation by providing in the Dictionary Act for a general rule on the
applicability of background tort theories. Statutes similar to the gen-
eral complicity and conspiracy statutes in Title 18123 which govern all
criminal provisions would generally apply to civil causes of action
under federal law. Then, for each cause of action, Congress could
choose whether to adopt, ignore, or modify the standard provisions,
119 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 317 (2d Cir. 2007)
(citing Central Bank as authority for the proposition that aiding and abetting cannot
be used in a § 1983 action under the federal civil rights laws).
120 See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325
U.S. 797, 809-10 (1945) ("It would be a surprising thing if Congress... had bestowed
upon such unions complete and unreviewable authority to aid business groups to
frustrate its primary objective."); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig.,
288 F.3d 1028, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing, in dicta, that aiding and abet-
ting an antitrust violation still carries the potential for both criminal and civil reper-
cussions, but failing to discuss the possible significance of the Supreme Court's
Central Bank decision). Like RICO, antitrust already has an explicit conspiracy provi-
sion. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("Every ... conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.").
121 See supra notes 19, 24.
122 See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006) (providing a cause of action for "any national
of the United States" harmed "by reason of an act of international terrorism"). The
court, through Judge Posner, relied heavily on the rules of construction set out in
Central Bank in concluding that the statute did not permit the extension of liability to
aiders and abettors. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 689
(7th Cir. 2008) (en banc) ("[S]tatutory silence on the subject of secondary liability
means there is none . . . section 2333(a) authorizes awards of damages to private
parties but does not mention aiders and abettors or other secondary actors."). The
decision overruled a threejudge panel's determination that the terrorism statute
encompassed claims of secondary liability. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and
Dev., 511 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2007).
123 See supra notes 43-44.
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as is already the case within Title 18. These civil liability statutes
would recognize, as the courts seem to have done indirectly, that cer-
tain basic concepts of liability inhere in the term "person" and that
courts should construe statutes according to these principles in order
to fully implement Congressional intent.
CONCLUSION
Personhood is an important idea in the law, and this Note
attempts to demonstrate that the manner in which a statutory scheme
defines "person" substantially impacts the interpretation and applica-
tion of that scheme. Congress has not ignored this fact, and has made
some initial efforts towards giving the term a consistent meaning.
Nevertheless, it has fallen short of this goal in a number of ways. The
definition of "person" in the Dictionary Act "includes" an indefinite
class of entities. Many statutes use the term "person" to define both
the class of people with standing to bring claims and the class that can
violate the law, a tension that neither the Dictionary Act nor the indi-
vidual statutory definitions seem to countenance. Individual defini-
tions within particular statutes often fail to address either concern.
Moreover, Congress defines the concepts of secondary and vicarious
liability that undergird the term "person" in a haphazard fashion.
Sometimes, it writes them down explicitly; at other times, it trusts that
the courts will pick up on congressional intent without prompting and
read the appropriate theory into the statutory text.
Congress' failure to provide sound guidance on these issues
forces judges into difficult choices when construing statutes. These
choices may be undermining congressional intent in a number of stat-
utes, whether by excluding certain important classes of legal persons
from lawsuit, or by raising the threshold of participation in unlawful
activity so as to exclude parties one might presume would be responsi-
ble. Some of this confusion may be inevitable, as Congress' approach
to drafting statutes and the preferred methodological approach of the
courts towards these problems is constantly in flux and rarely synchro-
nized. Nevertheless, simple legislative enactments clarifying the defi-
nition of the term "person" and the background concepts it enshrines
would greatly mitigate these problems. Lawyers and legislators may
not be in the habit of asking what the term "person" means; this Note
has hopefully shown that the question is essential to a complete
understanding of the limits of a statutory regime.
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